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 The U.S. Courts of Appeals, working principally through three-judge panels, constitute important final arbiters of the
 meaning of the federal constitution, laws, and regulations and, hence, significant policymakers within the federal system.
 En banc rehearing-reconsideration of the decision of a three-judge panel by the full complement ofjudges appointed to the
 circuit-is an institutional device that ensures circuit decisions are in line with the established preferences of the circuit. The
 use of en banc varies in frequency across circuits and within circuits over time. Drawing on legal, attitudinal, and strategic
 perspectives of judicial behavior, we develop and test a set of integrated expectations regarding the causes of this variation.
 Our analysis finds support for the operation of all three models and suggests that the influence of ideology on the use of en
 banc in the recent era is not unique but part of a long-standing pattern.
 On September 15, 2003, a three-judge panel of the
 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit over-
 turned a decision by a U.S. District Court and
 postponed the recall election for the governor of Califor-
 nia.' This decision by three of the circuit's more liberal
 judges was viewed by commentators as a boon to theelec-
 toral prospects of the sitting governor, Gray Davis. For
 the overwhelming majority of cases decided by the U.S.
 Courts of Appeals, the decision of the three-judge panel
 constitutes the final decision in the case. In the Califor-
 nia recall case, however, a majority of the active judges
 on the Ninth Circuit voted to vacate the panel decision
 and to rehear the case sitting en banc.2 On September 23,
 2003, the en banc panel unanimously affirmed the Dis-
 trict Court judge's finding against the plaintiffs, and the
 recall election occurred as scheduled.
 The California recall case highlights the political and
 legal significance of the decisions of the U.S. Courts of Ap-
 peals. In this case, and in many far less visible cases each
 year, the Courts of Appeals, working principally through
 three-judge panels, render decisions that affect how elec-
 tions are conducted, how business is regulated, and the
 limits of government encroachment on the rights of indi-
 viduals. These decisions are subject to appeal to the U.S.
 Supreme Court, but such review is currently exercised in
 fewer than 70 cases a year, far less than one-tenth of 1%
 of the cases decided by the Courts of Appeals. Thus, the
 U.S. Courts of Appeals constitute important final arbiters
 of the meaning of the federal constitution, laws, and reg-
 ulations and, hence, significant policymakers within the
 federal legal system.
 The California case also highlights the problem in-
 herent in a central institutional component of the U.S.
 Courts of Appeals-the use of three-judge panels. The
 decisions of three-judge panels constitute precedent bind-
 ing on both U.S. District Courts and future panels within
 the circuit in which they are rendered. This is an efficient
 arrangement for processing cases, as it allows subsets of
 Micheal W. Giles is professor of political science, Emory University, Atlanta, GA 30322 (mgiles@emory.edu). Virginia A. Hettinger is
 professor of political science, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT 06269 (virginia.hettinger@uconn.edu). Christopher Zorn is professor
 of political science, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208 (zorn@sc.edu). Todd C. Peppers is professor of public affairs,
 Roanoke College, Salem, VA 24153 (peppers@roanoke.edu).
 'Southwest Voter Registration Education Project et al. v. Kevin Shelley, California Secretary of State, 344 E3d 882 (9th Cir. 2003).
 2In the Ninth Circuit the rehearing en banc traditionally occurred before 10 randomly selected active judges plus the Chief Judge of the
 Circuit. In January 2006, the number of judges was changed to 14 judges plus the Chief Judge. We discuss the use of this "mini-en banc"
 procedure at greater length below.
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 the judges assigned to the circuit to act with finality on
 behalf of the whole.3 However, as scholars have noted,
 this institutional design creates the possibility that pan-
 els will produce circuit law that is contrary to the pref-
 erences of a majority of the judges appointed to a cir-
 cuit (Abramowicz 2000; Atkins 1972; Van Winkle 1996).
 En banc rehearing-reconsideration of the case before
 the full or a larger complement of judges appointed to
 the circuit-is the institutional device employed by the
 Courts of Appeals to respond to this possibility. This pro-
 cedure was first approved by the U.S. Supreme Court in
 19414 and subsequently confirmed by Congress, through
 statute, in 1948.s
 En banc rehearing only occurs in a limited number of
 cases each year. For example, while the Courts of Appeals
 decided nearly 27,000 cases after oral argument or sub-
 mission of briefs in 1999, only 94 cases, less than 1%, were
 decided en banc in that year. While uniformly low, the in-
 cidence of en banc varies significantly both across circuits
 and within circuits across time. For example, in 1999 the
 First and Second Circuits decided only two cases en banc
 while the Ninth Circuit employed en banc 22 times; since
 1980 the use of en banc review in the Court of Appeals for
 the District of Columbia has ranged from as few as two
 in 1992 to as many as 10 in 1983.6
 What explains this variation across circuits and time
 in the use of en banc rehearing? Previous studies address-
 ing this question are relatively few in number and have
 focused principally on assessing the role of ideological
 conflict. Claims that en banc review was used to enforce
 circuit ideological discipline reached a fever pitch in the
 1980s and 1990s as first Reagan and then Bush appointees
 to the Courts of Appeals produced conservative circuit
 majorities (Schwartz 1988; Wermiel 1988). The credibil-
 ity of these charges was enhanced by the ideologically
 driven judicial recruitment of the Reagan administration
 and by the heightened ideological conflict that accompa-
 nied recruitment to the lower federal courts in the ad-
 ministrations of Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush
 (Goldman 1997). Moreover, some Reagan appointees to
 the bench openly espoused the ideological use of en banc.
 For example, "Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit
 urged the Reagan-appointed majority on that court to
 make greater use of en banc review, calling it 'a stabilizing
 process that makes sure the majority's voice is heard' "
 (Note 1989, . 3).7
 Attempts to assess the ideological conflict explanation
 for variation in the occurrence of en bancs, however, have
 produced mixed results. Solimine, examining en banc de-
 isions across all circuits in the years 1985-87, concluded
 that the data did not "... support the charge that the
 Reagan-appointed judges are using the en banc proce-
 dure as an ideological tool" (1988, 63). In contrast, Banks
 (1997), focusing on a single Court of Appeals, the D.C.
 Circuit, f r a longer period of time, found strong evidence
 for the operation of ideological conflict in the occurrence
 of en banc review. A note in the Harvard Law Review
 (1989) concurs with Banks' finding for the D.C. Circuit.
 Employing a slightly longer time period than Solimine
 (1988), it finds that the use of en banc increased in circuits
 where Reaga  appointees gained the majority.8
 Extant studies have also suffered from a number of
 shortcomings. Those studies have focused either on a few
 circuits for a relatively brief period of time or on single
 circuit  for longer periods of time. Either approach, while
 providing useful information, raises concerns about the
 g ner lizabilty of the findings. For example, the Court of
 Appeals for the District of Columbia is often cited as an es-
 pecially important court both in terms of the significance
 of the cases that it hears and the prominence of the judges
 that have served on it (including four current members
 of th  U.S. Supreme Court; Banks 1997, 1999). Given the
 policy saliency of the cases it hears and the strong ideo-
 logical divisions that have characterized its members, the
 D.C. Circui  would seem to be the most likely venue in
 which to find support for an ideological conflict argument
 for the use of en banc. Likewise, studies that focus only on
 th  Rea an era provide valuable insights into causal pro-
 cesses at work in that time period, but are unable to speak
 to the issue of whether this was a truly unique episode,
 as critics implied, or merely a continuation of business as
 usual in the Courts of Appeals.
 Second, with few exceptions extant studies have fo-
 cused almost solely on the role of judicial ideology. As a
 result, they have not given sufficient attention to alter-
 native explanations for variation in the use of en bancs.
 In particular, those studies that have not supported the
 3Note, however, that from the perspective of the circuit as a whole,
 this arrangement may not be efficient with respect to creating effi-
 cacious policy (cf. Shavell 1995, 2006).
 4 Textile Mills Securities Corporation v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326
 (1941).
 528 U.S.C. 46.
 6These figures are based on our data on en banc rehearings, which
 we describe more fully below.
 7Some Reagan judges, however, also spoke against such use of en
 banc. Kenneth Ripple of the Seventh Circuit stated that "(C)ertainly,
 no member of the court believes, I hope, that an en banc proceeding
 may be used as a vehicle to permit judges to further their own
 ideological predilections" Rakovich v. Wade, 850 F.2d 1179 (7th
 Cir.1987), cited in Solimine (1988, n. 16).
 8For a somewhat more complex result, see Giles, Walker, and Zorn
 (2006).
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 operation of ideology in the use of the en banc pro-
 cedure have not provided the reader with direct assess-
 ments of other plausible explanations. Finally, previous
 studies have adopted relatively unsophisticated models of
 the operation of ideology. Most critically in this regard,
 they have failed to consider how strategic considerations
 might impinge upon and condition the operation of ju-
 dicial ideology.
 In the present study we reexamine the question of
 what causes the observed variation in the occurrence of
 en banc review in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Unlike previ-
 ous studies, we examine the occurrence of en bancs across
 all circuits and across a broad sweep of time, from 1942
 to 1999. Moreover, we address this question by systemati-
 cally developing and assessing expectations derived from
 three alternative models of judicial behavior: attitudinal,
 strategic, and legal. Thus, the present study provides the
 first theoretically rigorous, comprehensive assessment of
 the causes of intercircuit and temporal variation in the
 use of en banc.
 Our study is therefore important for at least two rea-
 sons. First, scholars have long recognized that agenda set-
 ting is a crucial stage in the policy process (Bachrach and
 Baratz 1962; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Kingdon 1995;
 Schattschneider 1960). Among studies of the courts, con-
 sideration of this phenomenon has been confined largely
 to work on the decision to grant certiorari in the U.S.
 Supreme Court (e.g., Caldeira and Wright 1988; Caldeira,
 Wright, and Zorn 1999; Cameron, Segal, and Songer 2000;
 Pacelle 1991; Perry 1991; Ulmer 1984). As a rule, review
 by lower federal courts is nondiscretionary so long as
 threshold criteria such as jurisdiction and standing are
 met. The granting of rehearing en banc is thus a relatively
 rare opportunity to study discretionary agenda setting
 in the lower federal courts. Second, while more broadly
 framed than previous studies, the results of our analysis
 speak directly to the continuing political controversy over
 the selection of lower federal court judges, including those
 staffing the Courts of Appeals. It is well established that
 the ideological preferences of lower federal court judges
 are linked to their decisions (cf. Rowland and Carp 2000),
 but if attitudinal and strategic considerations loom large
 in the use of en banc rehearing, this suggests a much more
 explicitly and systematically politicized operation in the
 Courts of Appeals than has heretofore been established.
 Models of Judicial Behavior
 and Variation in the Occurrence
 of En Banc Review
 The decision to grant en banc rehearing is the end product
 of a complicated process that involves many actors, most
 critically the judges serving a particular circuit. A majority
 vote of active judges in a circuit is required to grant review.
 Our purpose in this article is to explain variatio  in the
 frequency of en banc rehearings across circuits and time.
 As a first step toward that goal we explica e the principal
 models of judicial behavior and derive their implications
 for the occurrence of en banc rehearing.
 The Attitudinal Model
 The basis for the so-called "attitudinal model" of judicial
 behavior lies in the notion that in making their rulings,
 judges are driven by their desire to implement their pol-
 icy preferences into law, subject to the constraints in the
 case before them. Judicial decisions are thus seen as a re-
 sult of the intersection of case context (party and issues)
 and the ideological preferences of the judges (Segal and
 Spaeth 2002). Myriad studies have supported this model
 by documenting the operation of policy preferences in the
 behavior of both Supreme Court justices and the judges
 of the U.S. Courts of Appeals.
 Viewed through the lens of the attitudinal model, the
 decision to grant en banc review reflects the desire of a
 majority of the judges on a circuit to move a panel out-
 come closer to its preferred policy position. While the
 attitudinal model predicts a causal linkage between the
 ideological makeup of a circuit and the occurrence of en
 banc review, the nature of that linkage admits at least two
 possible forms. First, the linkage could be relatively con-
 tinuous. The attitudinal model predicts that judges whose
 preferences are in the minority on a circuit will nonethe-
 less vote sincerely (that is, in favor of their most-preferred
 outcome) and according to those preferences. When they
 constitute the majority of a three-judge panel (that is, on
 "majority-minority" panels), such sincere, policy-based
 voting will yield an aggregate decision that conflicts with
 the preferences of the circuit majority-one that is ripe for
 en banc review. Thus the attitudinal model suggests that
 the more frequent the occurrence of majority-minority
 panels on a circuit, the greater the expected use of en banc
 review by the circuit majority. By extension, the observed
 variation in the occurrence of en banc review across time
 and circuits from the attitudinal perspective may be ex-
 plained in whole or in part by variation in the ideological
 heterogeneity of the circuits and the resulting variation in
 the occurrence of majority-minority panels.
 Second, the linkage between ideological voting and
 the occurrence of en banc review might reflect shifts in
 the ideological regimes within circuits. For example, in the
 1980s-after majority control of the D.C. Circuit shifted
 o judges appointed by Republican presidents-Judge Pa-
 ricia Wald of that circuit complained that "traditionally
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 in our Courts of Appeals, the en banc process has been
 utilized to test the correctness of new precedents, as soon
 as they are issued. What is novel in our circuit right now...
 is the increasing resort to en bancs to overrule venerable,
 heretofore respected circuit precedents. The shift is plainly
 a symptom of the rapidly changing makeup of the court"
 (Banks 1999, n. 91). In this view, then, en banc review is
 not simply a tool to monitor the current activities of pan-
 els, but also an instrument for altering long-established
 doctrines and precedents in the circuit to reflect the pref-
 erences of the new majority. It is this purported use of en
 banc review that underlies the controversies surrounding
 the emergence of Republican-appointed circuit majorities
 in the 1980s.
 The ideological regime change argument thus leads
 to the expectation of a surge in the occurrence of en banc
 review following a shift in the ideological control of a cir-
 cuit. In particular, it suggests that a change in the partisan
 majority of the circuit (say, from liberal to conservative,
 or vice versa) should be followed by an increase in the
 use of en banc review, as the new circuit majority uses the
 en banc procedure to overturn previous (and now disfa-
 vored) circuit precedents. Finally, we should emphasize
 that the two attitudinal linkages between ideological vot-
 ing and en banc review are not mutually exclusive. Under
 this model, variation in the occurrence of en bancs may
 reflect both variation in the ideological diversity of a cir-
 cuit and shifts in its ideological regime.
 The Strategic Model
 Like the attitudinal model, the strategic model begins with
 the premise that judges have as a central goal the further-
 ance of their preferred policy positions. It departs from
 the attitudinal model by emphasizing that judges pursue
 their policy preferences in a sophisticated manner-that
 is, while taking into account the policypreferences of other
 relevant actors and the institutional context in which the
 decision is made. While in general evidence for the op-
 eration of the strategic model in the Courts of Appeals is
 mixed (e.g., Blackstone and Navarro 2006; Cross and Tiller
 1998; Giles, Walker, and Zorn 2006; but see Hettinger,
 Lindquist, and Martinek 2004; Klein 2002), the en banc
 rehearing, which allows the circuit majority to super-
 vise the wayward tendencies of majority-minority panels,
 is precisely the type of institutional context the strate-
 gic model envisions as eliciting sophisticated behavior to
 avoid review.9
 This sophisticated behavior can take several forms.
 Maj rity-minority panels may conceal their preferences
 and conform their decisions to the preferences of the cir-
 cuit majority, thus avoiding en banc rehearing. Alterna-
 tively, minority judges may depart from their preferences
 to fashion an outcome close enough to the preferred posi-
 tion of the circuit majority that the policy gains to the cir-
 cuit majority of conducting an en banc rehearing will not
 offs t the associated costs. Finally, the majority-minority
 panel may produce a result in which its preferred party
 wins, but the decision is deeply embedded in the factual
 co text of the case, thus reducing the value of the case as
 precedent and reducing the likelihood of en banc review
 (Smith and Tiller 2002).
 As a result of the potential for sophisticated behavior
o the part of judges in the circuit minority, the strategic
perspective does not expect that variation in ideologi-
c l heterogeneity across time, and circuits will translate
 straightforwardly into variation in the occurrence of en
 ba c rehearings. In fact, given perfect information about
 th  preferences of the judges on the circuit, a simple strate-
g c model predicts that the minority judges controlling
 panels would always fashion their decisions in ways to
 avoid en banc review and reversal.'1 Of course, informa-
 tio  concerning the policy preferences of the judges on a
 circuit is not perfect. Through the practice of rotating
 panel memberships, Courts of Appeals judges interact
 with all other members of the circuit and are likely to
 have reasonably good but not perfect information about
 the preferences of their colleagues."
 The presence of imperfect information can con-
 tribute to an increase in the likelihood of an en banc
 rehearing in two ways. First, the minority judges con-
 trolling a panel may be more likely to vote sincerely and
 risk en banc rehearing because imperfect information re-
 sults in uncertainty over the distribution of circuit pref-
 erences. With perfect information, minority judges know
 they will lose on en banc rehearing, but imperfect infor-
 mation makes that outcome less certain (and a sincere
 9Our test of the strategic model may thus be considered as one
 where such behavior is "most likely" to occur.
 'oThis simple model considers only a single panel decision with
 possible en banc review, thus ignoring the possibility of other in-
 fluences. For example, it may be the case that the U.S. Supreme
 Court might support the panel's decision even after en banc rever-
 sal, thus rendering sincere behavior more attractive to the panel.
 11As a general matter, judges in a circuit are randomly assigned to
 three-member panels that then hear a set of cases that have also been
 randomly assigned to that panel; the broad contours of this process
 are broadly laid out in 28 U.S.C. ? 46, while the details can be found
 in the Internal Operating Procedures of each circuit. For example,
 Fourth Circuit Internal Operating Procedure 34.1 states in part that
 "(T)he Clerk of Court maintains a list of mature cases available for
 oral argument and on a monthly basis merges those cases with a list
 of three-judge panels provided by a computer program designed to
 achieve total random selection."
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 vote correspondingly more likely). Second, imperfect in-
 formation may simply yield more errors in prediction by
 the minority judges. That is, minority judges controlling
 panels may vote sincerely because less than perfect in-
 formation leads them wrongly to predict that they have
 the support of a majority of the circuit judges for their
 position.
 One factor that may affect the quality of informa-
 tion concerning circuit preferences is the stability of the
 membership of the circuit. In a circuit characterized by
 stable membership over several years, the judges will
 have interacted more frequently with their colleagues
 and thus will have better information about their pol-
 icy preferences than will be the case in a circuit with
 high membership turnover and shorter tenures. Thus,
 whether through greater risk taking or simple prediction
 errors by minority judges, a strategic perspective leads us
 to expect that circuits with greater instability in mem-
 bership will experience a higher frequency of en banc
 rehearing.12
 Note that to this point our characterization of the
 strategic model has assumed the existence of a signifi-
 cant degree of ideological disagreement on the circuit in
 question. In fact, the strategic perspective predicts that
 membership stability and ideological heterogeneity will
 interact in their influence on the frequency of en bancs
 in a circuit. That is, while an attitudinal perspective pre-
 dicts that en bancs will be more frequent in ideologically
 heterogeneous circuits than in ideologically homogenous
 ones, the strategic model suggests that this difference
 will diminish or even disappear with increases in cir-
 cuit membership stability. This is because as judges on
 a circuit serve together longer, their information about
 the circuit's aggregate preferences improves in accuracy,
 thus allowing them to better avoid making decisions that
 might invite en banc review. The negative effect of in-
 creases in membership stability on the frequency of en
 bancs predicted by the strategic model will be exacer-
 bated by greater circuit heterogeneity. The magnitude of
 that negative effect will be small on ideologically homo-
 geneous circuits-where en bancs are less likely to occur
 in general-and larger on circuits that are ideologically
 heterogeneous.
 The Legal/Organizational Perspective
 While there is extensive support for the operation of ideo-
 logical preferences in the lower courts, there is also ample
 evidence that ideology alone does not control judicial be-
 havior at this level. Judicial ideology, as noted previously,
 has been linked consistently to the voting of Courts of Ap-
 peals judges, but in most of these studies it explains a rela-
 tively small percentage of the variation in judicial behavior
 (cf. Songer and Haire 1992; Songer, Sheehan, and Haire
 2000). Even when the traditional measure of judicial ide-
 ology, party of the appointing president, is replaced with
 more sophisticated measures, the percentage of variance
 explained under the most favorable circumstances does
 not exceed 20% (Giles, Hettinger, and Peppers 2001). The
 overwhelming majority of cases at the Courts of Appeals
 are disposed of without dissent, with judges of all ide-
 ological persuasions coming to the same decision. Even
 Segal and Spaeth (2002), the chief emissaries of the attitu-
 dinal school, allow that below the Supreme Court factors
 other than attitudes may influence the decision making
 of judges.
 One set of such factors captured in the operation of
 the legal model is law and legal reasoning. This view asserts
 that the high levels of unanimity observed in decisions of
 the Courts of Appeals arise despite ideological diversity
 because the application of relatively clear rules to relatively
 clear factual settings results in a single, clearly appropriate
 outcome (Edwards 1998). This view is bolstered by the
 reality that absent agenda controls, the caseload of the
 Courts of Appeals includes a large number of relatively
 pro forma cases.
 In the classic model of legal decision making, the only
 sources of disagreement between two judges confronted
 with the same set of case facts are either error in the iden-
 tification of the appropriate rule or poor legal reasoning.
 While these sources of disagreement among judges per-
 sist in the more contemporary version of the model, its
 more realistic treatment of the ambiguity of language, the
 existence of multiple relevant but not controlling prece-
 dents, and the flexible nature of legal reasoning, admit to
 the possibility that competent judges, reasoning well and
 in good faith, can come to different conclusions regard-
 ing the same case (Cross 1997; Edwards 1998). Some of
 these differences may reflect differences in judicial ideol-
 ogy, but they may also reflect systematic differences in the
 weights that judges give to precedents from different cir-
 cuits, approaches to treatment of language, and so forth.
 In short, judges may simply vary in their practice of the
 legal model.
 Quite different expectations regarding the occurrence
 of en banc review arise if judges of the Courts of Appeals
 12The longer judges serve together, the better internalized are cir-
 cuit norms. But norms themselves can vary in their favorableness
 toward en bancs across circuits and over time. So longer average
 tenure on a circuit is consistent with both increased information
 and enhanced socialization, but absent a priori knowledge of circuit
 norms regarding en banc, it is reasonable to attribute the expecta-
 tion that longer average tenure will condition the affect of attitudes
 on the frequency of en bancs to the strategic effects of increased
 information.
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 are assumed to be employing the legal model than if they
 are employing either the attitudinal or the strategic mod-
 els. First, if a legal model is operative, the likelihood of
 conflicting legal interpretations and perspectives can be
 expected to increase as the number of judges on a circuit
 increases. If there are systematic differences among judges
 in their application of the legal model, then the likelihood
 that such differences will arise and produce conflicts in-
 creases as the number of judges increases (Abramowicz
 2000; Ginsburg and Falk 1991; Howard 1981). Even the
 Court of Appeals judges interviewed by Wasby (1979)
 assumed that an increase in the number of judges in a
 circuit would necessitate an increased need for en banc
 rehearings.13 Importantly, and in contrast to the mod-
 els described above, this expectation occurs irrespective
 of the preferences of the judges on the circuit-that is,
 in this view it is sheer numbers, rather than ideological
 heterogeneity, that drive the en banc process.
 At the same time, organizational considerations sug-
 gest that the effect of the number of judges in a circuit on
 the occurrence of en banc may be nonlinear. As the num-
 ber of judges on a circuit increases, the costs associated
 with holding an en banc also rise, and the correspond-
 ing benefits to each judge decrease. The more judges in-
 volved in an en banc rehearing, the more cumbersome
 the process (Wasby 1979). Similarly, in their description
 of en banc hearings in the years immediately preceding the
 division of the Fifth Circuit, Barrow and Walker (1988)
 provide a graphic illustration of the difficulties associated
 with en banc review in circuits with larger numbers of
 judges. Moreover, not only are en banc rehearings pro-
 cedurally cumbersome with large numbers of participat-
 ing judges, but the rewards to the individual judges are
 also diminished. The larger number of participants means
 less opportunity for any single judge to impact the out-
 come significantly. This suggests that while the number
 of panel-circuit conflicts may increase geometrically with
 the number of judges, limited resources and decreasing
 returns to participation act as a constraint on granting en
 banc. Thus, the effect of the number of judges in a circuit
 is expected to be curvilinear, first increasing but subse-
 quently decreasing as the number of judges on the circuit
 grows.
 Second, under the legal model we expect that the
 judges would take seriously the admittedly vague stan-
 dard for granting review. This standard essentially is that
 en bane review will be granted to cases raising important
 or significant issues.14 In general, while the mix of cases
 varies across circuits, it seems reasonable to assume that
 the likelihood of important or significant cases will in-
 crease with circuit caseload.'" Thus we expect variation
 in the occurrence of en banc review across time and cir-
 cuits to be driven by similar variation in circuit caseloads.
 A positive relationship between caseloads and the use
 of en banc may also reflect organizational realities. The
 stress of higher caseloads may simply yield more errors by
 three-judge panels in need of correction through en banc
 (Abramowicz 2000).
 Data
 We analyze the expectations derived from the models de-
 scribed above using data on the incidence of en banc re-
 hearings across all 12 circuits of the U.S. Courts of Appeals
 for the period from 1942-the year after the Supreme
 Court's validation of the use of en banc-through 1999,
 inclusive.16 Our central variable of interest is the incidence
 of en banc cases in each circuit in each year. To measure
 the number of en banc cases, we identified the judges sit-
 ting in a circuit in a given year and used Lexis-Nexis to
 search for cases containing combinations of four of the
 judges' names. We then examined the cases generated by
 this search to see if each qualified as an en banc. In doing
 so, our threshold for inclusion was broad; essentially, any
 case decided by more than three judges was included in the
 list. We repeated this process for each circuit/year using
 different combinations of judges' names. Depending on
 the number of judges in the circuit, the number of com-
 binations searched ranged from six to more than a dozen.
 Only in the circuit/years with a small number of judges
 did we examine all possible combinations of judges.17
 13The logic here is similar to that for the attitudinal model concern-
 ing the emergence of majority-minority panels, but the minority
 referred to in the legal model is nonideological.
 '4While the wording differs somewhat from circuit to circuit, the
 stated bases upon which a case will be heard en banc are the fol-
 lowing: (1) the panel's decision is in conflict with a decision of the
 U.S. Supreme Court or a previous decision of the circuit wherein
 it arises, or (2) the case is exceptionally significant. While intracir-
 cuit conflict takes primacy of place in the rules, available evidence
 suggests that significance of the case is the dominant consideration
 in granting review (Bennett and Pembroke 1985-86; Note 1989).
 "5The fact that arguably some circuits, such as the D.C. Circuit,
 have a higher frequency of important cases is captured by the fixed
 effects for circuits included in the analysis.
 16For those years in which circuits had only three authorized judge-
 ships and en banc rehearing was irrelevant as an oversight insti-
 tution, the circuits were treated as missing and excluded from the
 analysis.
 17Since 1966, the Administrative Office of the Federal Courts (AO)
 has reported the number of cases decided en banc. To assess the
 reliability of our approach, we compared our data to the AO data for
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 FIGURE 1 En Banc Rehearings by Circuit and Year, 1942-1999
 First Second Third Fourth
 Fifth Sixth Seventh Eighth
 1940 1960 1980 2000 1940 1960 1980 2000 1940 1960 1980 2000 1940 1960 1980 2000
 Year
 The result of this process is, we believe, the first defini-
 tive, comprehensive list of cases decided en banc in the
 U.S. Courts of Appeals between 1942 and 1999, inclusive.
 Figure 1 plots the annual number of such cases for each
 of the 12 circuits. En bancs were comparatively rare in
 the 1940s and 1950s, averaging only one or two per cir-
 cuit per year. They increase significantly throughout the
 1960s and 1970s, attaining their highest number shortly
 after the division of the Fifth Circuit in 1981; since then,
 their numbers have remained more or less constant at six
 or seven per circuit per year on average.
 Measuring Ideology
 Both the attitudinal model and the strategic model lead
 to the expectation that the ideological composition of a
 circuit will influence the frequency with which en banc
 rehearings occur. Assessing these expectations requires
 that we have measures of the ideological preferences of
 judges and that we know the composition of each circuit
 for each year in the study.
 The party of the appointing president has tradi-
 tionally been the measure employed to estimate the
 ideological preferences of lower federal court judges.
 Judges appointed by Democratic presidents are assumed
 to be more liberal than those appointed by Republican
 presidents, an assumption well supported by empirical
 evidence.18 We accordingly employ the party of the ap-
 pointing president, as obtained from the Courts of Ap-
 peals biographical database, as our measure of judicial
 ideology.19
 the years 1966 through 1970. If our approach had identified fewer
 en bancs than the Administrative Office, this would suggest that our
 method failed to identify all of the en bancs that occurred. In fact,
 the counts of en bancs generated by our approach were uniformly
 greater than those provided by the Administrative Office. George
 and Solimine (2001) have also noted the discrepancy between the
 actual number of en bancs and the number reported by the AO.
 It appears that the AO requests this information from the circuits,
 but provides little definition for what qualifies as an en banc, and
 uncritically accepts the reported numbers. As a further validity
 check, we also compared our list of en banc cases to partial lists
 compiled by other scholars; our method identified over 95% of the
 en banc cases listed in those studies.
 "8The studies supporting this point are legion; Pinello (1999) sum-
 marizes them in a comprehensive meta-analysis.
 '9Giles, Hettinger, and Peppers (2001) developed an alternative ap-
 proach to measuring judicial preferences that employs the common
 space ideological scores of presidents and senators created by Poole
 (1998). However, the common space scores for presidents are only
 available for Truman forward, which prevents us from measuring
 the preferences of a significant number of judges appointed by
 Roosevelt who served into the 1960s. As a result, measures of cir-
 cuit ideological diversity based on the Giles, Hettinger, and Peppers
 (2001) approach would be systematically biased by missing data for
 most circuits until the 1960s. Omitting these circuit/years would
 substantially and systematically truncate the time series. Moreover,
 while the two indicators of judicial ideology are strongly correlated,
 relying on the party of the appointing president provides a better
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 The appointment and departure dates for each judge
 are also available in the biographical database. Thus for
 each year it is relatively easy to determine if a judge is
 sitting on a Court of Appeals. The only difficulty comes
 when judges are appointed and/or leave during the year. In
 these instances the seats may remain vacant throughout
 the year, may remain vacant most of the year, or may
 be filled almost immediately. Moreover, the vacancy may
 occur early in the year or at the very end of the year. To
 address these issues we adopted the rule that if any judges
 served less than six months in a calendar year they were
 treated as not serving in that year. So if judges retired, took
 senior status or died before June, or were appointed after
 July of a year, those judges were treated as not serving in
 that year.20
 To measure ideological heterogeneity, we identified
 circuits in each year as having either a majority of judges
 appointed by a Democratic president, a majority ap-
 pointed by a Republican president, or an equal parti-
 san division.21 We used standard combinatorial formulae
 to determine the number of possible majority-minority
 three-judge panels (i.e., majority Democratic panels in
 Republican majority circuits and majority Republican
 panels in majority Democratic circuits) expected to oc-
 cur in each circuit/year given the number of majority and
 minority judges actively serving.22 Dividing the number
 of majority-minority panels by the total number of pos-
 sible three-judge panels in each circuit/year yields the ex-
 pected proportion of all possible three-judge panels in a
 circuit/year that are majority-minority panels; an alterna-
 tive interpretation of this measure is as the probability that
 a randomly constituted panel will be majority-minority
 in that circuit/year. It ranges from 0-for a circuit that
 in a given year has either one or no minority judges, and
 hence no possibility of majority-minority panels-to 0.5,
 indicating that a circuit is evenly divided between judges
 appointed by Democratic and Republican presidents.23
 Partisan regime change was coded 1 in the year when
 the majority of the judges appointed to a circuit shifted
 from one party to the other and 0 in all other circuit/years.
 In the simplest case, regime change occurs when a cir-
 cuit that in the previous year had consisted of a majority
 of judges appointed by Republican (Democratic) presi-
 dents, in the current year has a majority of judges ap-
 pointed by Democratic (Republican) presidents. A some-
 what more complex pattern occurs when a circuit moves
 from having a majority of judges appointed by presi-
 dents of one party one year to an even balance of par-
 tisan appointments. Since an evenly divided court cannot
 change circuit law, this condition is not treated as a regime
 change. From this "neutral" position, a regime change
 could only occur if in a subsequent year the majority of
 the judges on the circuit are appointed by presidents of the
 party opposite to that controlling before the court became
 equally balanced. Thus, a regime change is only recorded
 when a shift in the partisan majority on a circuit is
 completed.
 Circuit Stability
 The strategic approach leads us to expect that increases
 in the stability of circuit membership will dampen the
 positive effects of ideological heterogeneity on the fre-
 quency of en banc rehearings. Drawing on Zuk, Barrow,
 and Gryski (1996), we computed the length of service for
 each judge in each circuit and include a variable which
 measures the years of service for the judge with the me-
 dian tenure.
 Legal/Organizational Factors
 Our measure of the number of judges on each circuit re-
 lies on Zuk, Barrow, and Gryski (1996); those data allow
 us to compute the actual number of judges sitting on a
 circuit in any given year. The Administrative Office of the
 correspondence to the principle concepts of interest in this study
 (e.g., regime change and majority-minority panels). Data on the
 party of each judge's appointing president come from Zuk, Barrow,
 and Gryski (1996); we extended this information for judges ap-
 pointed after 1994.
 20Forty-one judge/years were deleted on this basis. In 10 additional
 instances two judges served six months each in the same seat (left
 in June, replacement appointed in July). In these instances, the
 incumbent was treated as serving the entire year.
 210ur approach does not take into consideration the majority-
 minority panels created by the continuing service of senior judges
 on circuits, or of the presence of district court judges sitting by
 designation. Since the number of cases in which senior and/or des-
 ignated judges participate varies considerably, it was not possible to
 include this factor in our computation of the partisan heterogeneity
 of the circuits. Note, however, that neither senior nor designated
 judges vote on whether a case is to be granted en banc review.
 22The expected number of majority-minority panels typically does
 not occur, since the full complement of possible panels are usually
 not employed in a given year. However, our expectation is that,
 given random construction of the panels, the actual numbers of
 majority-minoritypanels will vary strongly across circuit/years with
 the expected number.
 23Indeed, an alternative measure of circuit ideological heterogene-
 ity is simply the percentage of Democratic or Republican judges
 serving on a circuit in a given year "folded" at 50%. This measure
 ranges from 0 when a circuit is homogeneous in partisanship to 0.5
 when it is evenly split in partisanship. This measure is strongly cor-
 related with our measure based on the frequency of minority panels
 (r = 0.92) but does not reflect as well the logic of the attitudinal
 argument.
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 TABLE 1 Summary Statistics
 Variable Expectations Mean Standard Deviation Min. Max.
 Dependent Variable
 Cases Decided En Banc 4.69 4.47 0 29
 Independent Variables
 Legal/Organizational
 In(Caseload) + 6.40 0.92 4.84 8.46
 Fifth Circuit Split +/- 0.03 0.17 0 1
 Limited En Banc +/- 0.03 0.18 0 1
 Total Number of Judges + 9.20 4.16 3 28
 Total Number of Judges Squared - 101.9 115.1 9 784
 Attitudinal
 Regime Change + 0.06 0.23 0 1
 Pr(Majority-Minority Panel) + 0.21 0.15 0 0.50
 Strategic
 Median Circuit Tenure 8.53 3.73 1 23.5
 Pr(Majority-Minority Panel) x Median Circuit Tenure - 1.79 1.51 0 10
 Note: NT = 600 (N = 12 circuits, T = 50 years, on average).
 U.S. Courts provides the authorized number of judge-
 ships per circuit, but given vacancies, the actual number
 of judges sitting provides a better measure of the potential
 for simple disagreement and of the difficulties associated
 with conducting en banc rehearings. The Administrative
 Office of the U.S. Courts' data on the numbers of cases
 disposed of on hearing or submission provides our base
 measure of caseload. This figure is the number of cases
 actually resolved after significant investment of resources
 by the judges of the circuit. Following standard practice,
 we employ the natural log of caseload in the analysis (e.g.,
 Maddala 1983).
 During this time period two relevant structural
 changes occurred in the Courts of Appeals. First, in 1978
 Congress passed the Omnibus Judgeship Act, which in-
 cluded a provision allowing "mini" en bancs in circuits
 with more than 15 judges. Such mini en bancs consist
 of 10 randomly selected judges plus the Chief Judge of
 the circuit. As noted earlier, the Court of Appeals for the
 Ninth Circuit adopted this innovation in August 1980, but
 the first mini en banc rehearings did not occur until 1981
 (Hellman 1990). To date, no other circuit has followed
 the lead of the Ninth Circuit in adopting this procedure.
 The expected effect of this change on the incidence of en
 banc under the various models is uncertain.24 Nonethe-
 less, we create a dummy variable to capture the effects of
 the adoption of the mini en banc by the Ninth Circuit.
 This variable is equal to 0 for every year through 1980
 and 1 for 1981 and each following year. Second, in 1981
 Cong ess created the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
 Circuit by dividing the previous Fifth Circuit. We include
 a dummy variable to test the effect of this dramatic shift
 on the Fifth Circuit. Our Fifth Circuit split variable is
equal to 0 for all other circuits. For the Fifth, it is equal to
 0 fo  each year up to and including 1981 and 1 for 1982
 and each following year. Data for the Eleventh Circuit are
 treated as missing in the years prior to 1982.
 We provide descriptive statistics for all variables and
 summarize the expectations for the attitudinal, strate-
gic, and legal/organizational models in Table 1. Note that
 the key test between the attitudinal and strategic mod-
 els come  in our expectation vis-a-vis the interaction of
 Median Circuit Tenure and the probability of a Majority-
 Minority Panel: under the strategic account, this interac-
 tion ought to be strongly negative, while attitudinal theory
 suggests that its effect be undifferentiated from 0.
 Analysis
 Our data are cross-sectional time-series data, representing
 12 circuits over periods of 18 to 58 years. Our dependent
 24Hellman (1990) argues that since the outcomes from such rehear-
 ings will be unpredictable, the adoption of mini en bancs should
 decrease the frequency of their use. This is not inconsistent with our
 premise that uncertainty will increase en banc use because our fo-
 cus is on the behavior of circuit minority judges under uncertainty
 rather than on that of the circuit as a whole.
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 variable is a count variable that ranges from 0 to 29, with
 the majority of observations falling in the range from 0
 to 11. The nature of these data leads us to employ the
 method of generalized estimating equations (GEE) (Zorn
 2001), assuming a conditional Poisson distribution for
 our measure of en banc counts; we adopt an AR(1) spec-
 ification for the conditional within-unit covariance ma-
 trix. We also include fixed effects for each of the 12 cir-
 cuits, with the First Circuit omitted for identifiability;
 these serve as controls for circuit-level factors (e.g., dif-
 ferences in case mix) not expressly incorporated in the
 model.25 For example, some circuits have a practice of
 informally circulating opinions among all the judges on
 the circuit for comments and suggestions. This could have
 the effect of reducing the need for en banc review.26 We
 report our model estimates in Table 2.
 We begin our discussion with the variables captur-
 ing organizational changes in the Courts of Appeals.27
 With respect to those changes, it is interesting to note
 that the one most closely associated with circuit work-
 load issues-the division of the Fifth Circuit-appears to
 exhibit no influence on the rate of en bancs. In the years
 prior to its division the Fifth Circuit averaged 5.5 en bancs
 per year. In the years since the division it has averaged 10.4
 per year.28 This difference in frequency, however, declines
 and becomes statistically insignificant once the other vari-
 ables in the model are taken into account. In contrast, the
 presence of the limited en banc procedure in the Ninth
 Circuit seems to have increased the frequency of en bancs.
 In the era without the mini en banc the Ninth Circuit av-
 eraged 3.2 en banc rehearings per year, compared to 9.9
 after the procedure was adopted. The results in Table 2
 indicate that this mean difference was largely attributable
 to changes in the other variables included in the model,
 but even with such factors as increases in caseload and the
 number of judges controlled, the mini en banc appears to
 have increased the frequency of en banc hearings in the
 Ninth Circuit.
 Our variables corresponding to the legal/
 organizational explanation (that is, caseload and
 number of judges) were expected to exert a positive
 influence on the number of en banc rehearings. These
 expectations are strongly supported by the empirical
 results. Not surprisingly, caseload is highly related to the
 occurrence of en bancs; within the ranges of our data,
 an increase of 1,000 cases in a circuit's annual caseload
 yields an expected increase of roughly two en banc
 rehearings. The magnitude of the effect for circuit size
 is similar, but is as expected, curvilinear; the predicted
 number of en bancs increases as the number of judges
 in a circuit goes from four to 15, then decreases. With
 the other variables in the model set at their means, this
 corresponds to an increase in the expected number from
 four to six, with a subsequent decrease back to four.
 Since the effect of a higher number of judges on the
 circuit is significant with both attitudinal and strategic
 variables controlled, this result provides support for the
 operation of nonideological, legal differences among
 the judges in their decisions regarding granting en banc
 review.
 We tested two variables for evidence of attitudinal
 influences on the number of en banc rehearings. The ef-
 fect for the first indicator of ideological influence, regime
 change, fails to achieve statistical significance. Given the
 accounts in the literature of increased en banc usage to
 accomplish the policy goals of a new regime, we explored
 this relationship in considerable detail. First, we created
 two new indicators of regime change that capture changes
 in the frequency of en bancs occurring not only in the year
 of regime change, as does our original measure, but also
 changes occurring one and two years afterwards. These
 measures allow for the possibility that a new ideologi-
 cal majority may not immediately exploit its position.29
 The effect of neither of these alternative measures was
 statistically significant when substituted for our original
 measure.
 Second, existing speculation on the effect of ide-
 ological regime changes focuses almost exclusively on
 the shift in partisan regimes in the Reagan/Bush era
 25The GEE approach with fixed effects thus allows us to simultane-
 ously deal with the possibility of residual circuit-level heterogeneity
 in en banc counts and temporal dependence within circuits over
 time. Our results are substantively and statistically identical if we
 instead estimate either fixed- or random-effects Poisson models, or
 if we adopt any of those models with a negative binomial specifica-
 tion in place of the Poisson; those results are available upon request
 from the authors.
 26We thank an anonymous reviewer for making us aware of this
 practice.
 27Note at the outset that the effects of the 11 circuit indicators are
 jointly significant (p < .001), indicating that substantial circuit-
 level differences in en banc use remain even after controlling for
 the variables in our specification. At the same time, the relative
 effects of the variables in the model are, in general, stronger than
 those for the circuit indicators; a Wald test indicates that the ex-
 planatory power of the nine covariates is greater than that of the 11
 circuit indicators (X2 = 148.1 and 214.9 with nine and 11 degrees
 of freedom, respectively).
 28This difference in means is significant at p < 0.01.
 29Over the past 20 years the median time from filing in the U.S.
 District Courts to final disposition in the Courts of Appeals has
 fluctuated around two years (Administrative Office of the Courts,
 various years, Table B4). Thus, our longest regime change indicator,
 which captures three years, would seem to encompass the potential
 for litigants to create new cases to serve the agenda of the new
 majority.
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 TABLE 2 Poisson Estimates of En Banc Review, 1942-1999
 Variable Estimate (Std. Error) Incident Rate Ratio
 (Constant) -1.60 -
 (1.08)
 In(Caseload) 0.36* 1.44
 (0.16)
 Fifth Circuit Split -0.24 0.78
 (0.17)
 Limited En Banc 0.58* 1.78
 (0.27)
 Total Number of Judges 0.13* 1.14
 (0.07)
 Total Number of Judges Squared -0.004* 0.996
 (0.002)
 Regime Change -0.04 0.96
 (0.09)
 Pr(Majority-Minority Panel) 1.53** 4.62
 (0.51)
 Median Circuit Tenure -0.001 0.999
 (0.012)
 Pr(Majority-Minority Panel) x Median Circuit Tenure -0.13* 0.88
 (0.06)
 Second Circuit -0.22 0.80
 (0.19)
 Third Circuit 0.91** 2.48
 (0.19)
 Fourth Circuit 1.07** 2.92
 (0.23)
 Fifth Circuit 0.85** 2.32
 (0.23)
 Sixth Circuit -0.28 0.78
 (0.23)
 Seventh Circuit 0.20 1.22
 (0.14)
 Eighth Circuit 0.71** 2.04
 (0.17)
 Ninth Circuit 0.41 1.50
 (0.21)
 Tenth Circuit 0.35* 1.41
 (0.14)
 Eleventh Circuit 0.59 1.81
 (0.32)
 D.C. Circuit 0.76** 2.15
 (0.21)
 Note: NT = 600. Cell entries are coefficient estimates; robust standard errors are in parentheses. One asterisk indicates p < .05, two
 indicate p <.01.
 to provide evidence for its operation. To determine if
 regime change, while not operative across the full time
 range of the study, was nonetheless operative in the Rea-
 gan/Bush era, we estimated regime change effects sep-
 arately for the Reagan/Bush era by creating a dummy
 variable for the appropriate years, multiplying it by the
 existing regime change variable and adding it to the equa-
 tion in Table 2. We employed a variety of time periods to
 capture the Reagan/Bush era, but regardless of the specific
 operationalization, the coefficient for the interaction term
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 FIGURE 2 Predicted Counts of En Bancs, by Circuit
 Heterogeneity and Tenure
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 was nonsignificant.30 These results suggest that our find-
 ings with regard to the lack of effect for regime change on
 the frequency of en bancs are generally robust.
 The second attitudinal variable, ideological hetero-
 geneity, performed as anticipated. The expected num-
 ber of en banc rehearings increases as the likelihood of a
 majority-minority panel increase. Conditional on hold-
 ing circuit tenure constant at 0, the expected number of
 en banc hearings in an evenly divided circuit is 2.1 times
 higher than in a circuit with zero or one minority judges.
 As explained below, however, this interpretation of the di-
 rect effect of ideological heterogeneity is misleading given
 the inclusion in the model of an interaction effect be-
 tween median tenure and ideological heterogeneity. Sim-
 ilarly, the statistical insignificance of the strategic variable,
 median tenure, is also misleading in the presence of the
 interaction term.
 A more useful interpretation focuses on the joint
 effects of heterogeneity, median circuit tenure, and the
 interaction of the two. Figure 2 provides a graphical
 interpretation of the influences of these variables. The
 contour plot shows the expected number of en banc re-
 hearings against these two variables over their ranges in
 the data, holding the other covariates constant at the
 means (for continuous variables) or medians (for dis-
 crete covariates). Lighter regions correspond to lower ex-
 pected numbers of en bancs, while darker regions indicate
 higher numbers. Consistent with the strategic perspec-
 tive, if the probability of a majority-minority panel is 0,
 then the expected number of en banc rehearings stays
 nearly constant, regardless of how stable the member-
 ship of the circuit is. Conversely, if the probability of a
 majority-minority panel is high (that is, if the circuit is
 almost evenly split between Democrats and Republicans),
 the predicted count of en banc rehearings is highly re-
 sponsive to circuit tenure, with increases in circuit stabil-
 ity yielding substantial decreases in the occurrence of en
 banc rehearings. Similarly, when median tenure is low, the
 predicted count of en bancs increases substantially with
 increases in the probability of a majority-minority panel.
 As circuit tenure increases past about 12 years, however,
 the relationship grows less positive, and above that level of
 tenure the expected number ofen banc rehearings actually
 begins to decrease as a function of circuit heterogeneity.
 This last result should be taken with some caution; only
 about 13% of the circuit/years included in the study have
 median tenure greater than 12 years, and of those 70%
 occur prior to 1960. Thus, the slight negative effect iden-
 tified for ideological heterogeneity at high levels of tenure
 rests on a relatively small and temporally specific portion
 of the data examined.
 30Reagan took office in 1981, and Bush left office in 1993; our
 measures thus ranged from 1983 to 1989 at the shortest to 1983-
 1995 at the longest.
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 The findings for these variables are thus generally
 consistent with the strategic account of en banc occur-
 rences. That is, while our results suggest that ideological
 heterogeneity plays an important part in determining the
 frequency of en banc rehearings in a circuit, they also in-
 dicate that its effects are tempered by a consciousness of
 the preferences and likely behaviors of the other mem-
 bers of the circuit. Importantly, these effects persist even
 in the face of controls for legal and organizational factors,
 lending support to the idea that en banc review occurs at
 least in part as a result of strategic calculi.
 Conclusions
 The U.S. Courts of Appeals are increasingly significant
 policymakers within the American political system. While
 their use of three-judge panels allows for tremendous effi-
 ciencies, it also raises the possibility of decisions and pol-
 icy outcomes that do not reflect the views of a majority of
 the judges on a circuit. Rehearing of a panel decision by
 the members of the circuit sitting en banc is the one pro-
 cedure by which the circuit majority may monitor panel
 decisions. In the face of steadily declining numbers of de-
 cisions by the U.S. Supreme Court and the high levels of
 contentiousness over many Court of Appeals decisions,
 the importance of en banc review is arguably greater than
 it has ever been in history.
 Our work here is the first comprehensive, large-scale
 study of the phenomenon of en banc review in the U.S.
 Courts of Appeals.31 In doing so, we have assembled the
 most comprehensive data to date on the incidence of en
 banc review, finding that the frequency with which en
 banc rehearings have occurred varies significantly across
 both time and circuits. Drawing from the attitudinal,
 strategic, and legal/organizational perspectives on indi-
 vidual judicial behavior, we developed a set of integrated
 expectations regarding the causes of this macrolevel varia-
 tion. While the significance of fixed effects for the circuits
 indicates that we have not captured all the factors at work,
 the findings of our analysis are consistent with the oper-
 ation of all three models.
 Our results are clearly consistent with the operation
 of legal and organizational considerations in the use of
 en banc review: en bancs are more likely o occur with
 increases in caseload and the corresp nding i crease in
 numbe s of cases meeting the threshold of importance
 and the stresses of workload pressure likely to produce
 errors. The frequency of en bancs also increased with he
 number of judges assign d to a circuit and hence, the like-
 lihood of conflicting legal approaches increased. At the
 same time, the non inearity of this effect suggests that the
 judges may be deterred somewhat from employing the
 en banc process as the size of the circuit grows and th
 process becomes more cumbersome and costly. Whether
 this finding of nonlinearity supports a decision to divide
 circuits and reduce their size depends in part on whether
 one believes that there are cases that should be granted
 en banc review that are currently denied because of the
 constraint of size.
 Our findings also provide evidence that variation in
 th  use of en bancs across circuits and time is linked to
 variation in the ideological heterogeneity of the circuits.
 The influence of ideological considerations on the use
 f en banc has been a point of considerable controversy,
 but to date the evidence on this issue has been mixed.
 By contrast, our results leave little doubt that variation
 in the ideological heterogeneity of the circuits affects the
 frequency with which en bancs occur. In general, we find
 the greater the ideological heterogeneity on a circuit, the
 higher the frequency of en bancs. However, we also un-
 cover clear evidence that the effects of ideological factors
 are conditioned by strategic considerations. As the me-
 dian tenure in circuits increases and judges' information
 on majority preferences becomes clearer, the linkage be-
 twee  circuit ideological heterogeneity and the frequency
 of en bancs is diminished. This suggests that judges in the
 minority on a circuit-given good information about the
 preferences of the majority-modify their panel behavior
 i  response to avoid en banc rehearing. Evidence on the
 operation of the strategic model in the Courts of Appeals
 is mixed, and the context of en banc rehearing may con-
 stitute a "most likely" test of the operation of the model,
 but ur results indicate that the model passes the test.
 It has also been suggested that, particularly in the Rea-
 gan/Bush era, new partisan majorities on a circuit have
 employed en bancs to reshape the law of the circuit in
 accord with their policy preferences. In fact, our analysis
 finds no evidence of such a phenomenon, either across the
 full range of data considered or within the Reagan/Bush
 era alone. However, this result does not mean that Judge
 Wald's complaint about such a use of en bancs by the
 new partisan majority in her court was unfounded. First,
 such partisan ideological behavior could have resulted in
 an increased use of en bancs in some circuits and for
 some regime changes, including the one associated with
 31In related research Giles, Walker, and Zorn (2006) analyze in
 greater depth the process by which individual cases are chosen for
 en banc rehearing. While both studies examine the role of attitudes,
 strategy, and law on the use of en banc, our previous study examines
 a 10-year period (1981-91) in a single circuit, the Fifth. This arti-
 cle thus constitutes the next step in our research program focused
 on the role of en banc in the federal judicial hierarchy. Read together,
 the two papers provide an extensive and intensive examination of
 this seldom-studied but important institutional device.
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 her remarks; our results simply demonstrate that such
 behavior was not sufficiently systematic to be detected
 in a large-scale aggregate analysis. Second, new majori-
 ties may have systematically used en bancs to adjust es-
 tablished circuit policy to reflect their preferences, but if
 such cases replaced other, perhaps less partisan cases on
 the agenda for en banc-that is, if the change was one of
 the substance and not the frequency of en banc cases-
 that change would not be detectable here.
 Our results thus place the controversy concerning the
 ideological use of en bancs by Republican circuit majori-
 ties in the Reagan/Bush era in a somewhat different light.
 While such usage may have been more blatant during this
 period or more openly discussed, our evidence suggests
 that the influence of ideology on the use of en banc during
 the 1980s was not unique, but instead is part of a long-
 standing, general pattern that has typified the Courts of
 Appeals since the practice was adopted in 1942.
 Finally, our results provide a rare look at discretionary
 agenda setting in the Courts of Appeals. Studies of agenda
 setting at the Supreme Court have generally concluded
 that the decision to grant certiorari is a mixture of legal,
 strategic, and attitudinal factors (Caldeira, Wright, and
 Zorn 1999; Epstein and Knight 1998; Segal and Spaeth
 2002). Our results suggest that the use of en banc review
 in the Courts of Appeals is conditioned by a similar mix-
 ture of considerations. At the same time, it is evident by
 the variation in the use of en banc left unexplained by
 those factors that additional work needs to be done. In
 particular, the importance of the circuit-level effects sug-
 gests that circuit-specific contextual norms and practices
 are also at work in determining the use of the en banc
 procedure.32
 References
 Abramowicz, Michael. 2000. "En Banc Revisited." Columbia
 Law Review 100(6): 1600-41.
 Atkins, Burton. 1972. "Decision-making Rules and Judicial
 Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals." Western
 Political Quarterly 25(4): 626-42.
 Bachrach, Peter, and Morton S. Baratz. 1962. "Two Faces of
 Power." American Political Science Review 56(4): 947-52.
 Banks, Christopher P. 1997. "The Politics of En Banc Review
 in the 'Mini-Supreme Court."' Journal of Law and Politics
 13(2): 377-414.
 Banks, Christopher P. 1999. Judicial Politics in the D.C. Circuit.
 Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
 32For example, idiosyncratic factors also must certainly play a role.
 On the Second Circuit, Judge Learned Hand adamantly opposed
 the use of the en banc procedure. Only after Judge Hand retired
 and Judge Charles E. Clark, an advocate of en banc, became Chief
 Judge in 1954 did the Second Circuit hold en bancs (Schick 1970).
 Barrow, Deborah J., and Thomas G. Walker. 1988. A Court Di-
 vided: The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Politics of
 Judicial Reform. New Haven: Yale University Press.
 Baumgartner, Frank, and Bryan Jones. 1993. Agendas and In-
 stability in American Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago
 Press.
 Bennett, Steven, and Christine Pembroke. 1985-86. "'Mini' in
 Banc Proceedings: A Survey of Circuit Practices." Cleveland
 State Law Review 34(4): 531-65.
 Blackstone, Bethany, and Susan Navarro. 2006. "Regime Change
 and Decision-making in the U.S. Courts of Appeals." Pre-
 sented at the 2006 annual meeting of the Midwest Political
 Science Conference.
 Caldeira, Gregory A., and John R. Wright. 1988. "Organized
 Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court."
 American Political Science Review 82(4): 1109-27.
 Caldeira, Gregory A., John R. Wright, and Christopher
 Zorn. 1999. "Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping in the
 Supreme Court." Journal of Law, Economics, and Organiza-
 tion 15(3): 549-72.
 Cameron, Charles M., JeffreyA. Segal, and Donald Songer. 2000.
 "Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An Informa-
 tional Model of the Supreme Court's Certiorari Decisions."
 American Political Science Review 94(1): 101-16.
 Cross, Frank. 1997. "Political Science and the New Legal Re-
 alism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance."
 Northwestern University Law Review 92(1): 251-326.
 Cross, Frank B., and Emerson H. Tiller. 1998. "Judicial Parti-
 sanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing
 on the Federal Courts of Appeals." Yale Law Journal 107(7):
 2155-76.
 Edwards, Harry. 1998. "Collegiality and Decision Making on
 the D.C. Circuit." Virginia Law Review 84(7): 1335-70.
 Epstein, Lee, and Jack Knight. 1998. The Choices Justices Make.
 Washington, DC: CQ Press.
 George, Tracey, and Michael Solimine. 2001. "Supreme Court
 Monitoring of the United States Courts of Appeals En Banc."
 Supreme Court Economic Review 9: 171-204.
 Giles, Micheal W., Virginia A. Hettinger, and Todd Peppers.
 2001. "Picking Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and Partisan
 Selection Agendas." Political Research Quarterly 54(3): 623-
 41.
 Giles, Micheal W., Thomas G. Walker, and Christopher Zorn.
 2006. "Setting a Judicial Agenda: The Decision to Grant En
 Banc Review in the U.S. Courts of Appeals." Journal ofPolitics
 68(4): 852-66.
 Ginsburg, Douglas, and Donald Falk. 1991. "The Court En Banc:
 1981-1990." George Washington Law Review 59(5): 1008-
 91.
 Goldman, Sheldon. 1997. Picking Federal Judges: Lower Court
 Selection from Roosevelt through Reagan. New Haven: Yale
 University Press.
 Hellman, Arthur. 1990. "Maintaining Consistency in the Law
 of the Large Circuit." In Restructuring Justice, ed. Arthur
 Hellman. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
 Hettinger, Virginia A., Stefanie Lindquist, and Wendy Mar-
 tinek. 2004. "Comparing Attitudinal and Strategic Ac-
 counts of Dissenting Behavior on the U.S. Courts of Ap-
 peals." American Journal of Political Science 48(1): 123-
 37.
This content downloaded from 
            132.174.251.59 on Sat, 17 Jul 2021 16:06:19 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 THE ETIOLOGY OF EN BANC REVIEW 463
 Howard, J. Woodford. 1981. Courts of Appeals in the Federal
 Judicial System: A Study of the Second, Fifth and District of
 Columbia Courts. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
 Kingdon, JohnW. 1995. Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies.
 New York: Harper-Collins.
 Klein, David E. 2002. Making Law in the United States Courts of
 Appeals. New York: Cambridge University Press.
 Maddala, G. S. 1983. Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Vari-
 ables in Econometrics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
 Note. 1989. "The Politics of En Banc Review." Harvard Law
 Review 102(4): 864-84.
 Pacelle, Richard. 1991. The Transformation of the Supreme
 Court's Agenda. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
 Perry, H. W. 1991. Deciding to Decide: Agenda-Setting in the
 United States Supreme Court. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
 versity Press.
 Pinello, Daniel R. 1999. "Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in
 American Courts: A Meta-Analysis." Justice System Journal
 20(3): 219-54.
 Poole, Keith T. 1998. "Recovering a Basic Space from a Set of
 Issue Scales." American Journal ofPolitical Science 42(3): 954-
 93.
 Rowland, C. K., and Robert A. Carp. 2000. Politics and Judgment
 in Federal District Courts. Lawrence: University of Kansas
 Press.
 Schattschneider, E. E. 1960. The Semisovereign People: A Realist's
 View ofDemocracy in America. New York: Holt, Rinehart and
 Winston.
 Schick, Marvin. 1970. Learned Hand's Court. Baltimore: Johns
 Hopkins University Press.
 Schwartz, Herman. 1988. Packing the Courts: The Conser-
 vative Campaign to Rewrite the Constitution. New York:
 Scribner.
 Segal, Jeffrey A., and Harold J. Spaeth. 2002. The Supreme Court
 and the Attitudinal Model Revisited. New York: Cambridge
 University Press.
 Shavell, Steven. 1995. "The Appeals Process as a Means of Error
 Correction." Journal of Legal Studies 24(2): 379-426.
 Shavell, Steven. 2006. "The Appeals Process and Adjudicator
 Incentives." Journal of Legal S udies 35(1): 1-29.
 Smith, Joseph, and Emerson Tiller. 2002. "The Strategy of Judg-
 ing: Evidence from Administrative Law." Journal of Legal
 Studies 31(1): 61-82.
 Solimine, Michael. 1988. "Ideology and En Banc Review." North
 Carolina Law Review 67(1): 29-76.
 Songer, Donald R., and Susan Haire. 1992. "Integrating Alter-
 native Approaches to the Study of Judicial Voting: Obscenity
 Cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals." American Journal of
 Political Science 36(4): 963-82.
 Songer, Donald R., Reginald S. Sheehan, and Susan B. Haire.
 2000. Continuity and Change on the United States Courts of
 Appeals. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
 Ulmer, S. Sidney. 1984. "The Supreme Court's Certiorari De-
 cisions: Conflict as a Predictive Variable." American Political
 Science Review 78(4): 901-11.
 Van Winkle, Steven R. 1996. "Three-Judge Panels and Strategic
 Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals." Presented
 at the Conference on the Scientific Study of Judicial Politics,
 Washington University.
 Wasby, Stephen. 1979. "Inconsistency in the United States
 Courts of Appeals: Dimensions and Mechanisms for Res-
 olution." Vanderbilt Law Review 32(6): 1343-73.
 Wermiel, Stephen. 1988. "Full-Court Review of Panel Rulings
 Becomes Tool Often Used by Reagan Judges Aiming to Mold
 Law." Wall Street Journal, March 22: 70.
 Zorn, Christopher. 2001. "Generalized Estimating Equation
 Models for Correlated Data: A Review with Applica-
 tions." American Journal of Political Science 45(2): 470-
 90.
 Zuk, Gary, Deborah Barrow, and Gerard Gryski. 1996. Multi-
 User Database on the Attributes of U.S. Appeals Court Judges,
 1801-1994. Ann Arbor: ICPSR 6796.
This content downloaded from 
            132.174.251.59 on Sat, 17 Jul 2021 16:06:19 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
